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Malware Detection and Analysis
Namratha Suraneni
Advisor: Xinli Wang
Abstract - Malicious software poses a serious
threat to the cybersecurity of network
infrastructures and is a global pandemic in the
form of computer viruses, Trojan horses, and
Internet worms. Studies imply that the effects of
malware are deteriorating. The main defense
against malware is malware detectors. The
methods that such a detector employ define its level
of quality. Therefore, it is crucial that we research
malware detection methods and comprehend their
advantages and disadvantages. Attackers are
creating malware that is polymorphic and
metamorphic and has the capacity to modify their
source code as they spread. Furthermore, existing
defenses, which often utilize signature-based
approaches and are unable to identify the
previously undiscovered harmful executables, are
significantly undermined by the diversity and
volume of their variations. Malware families'
variations
exhibit
common
behavioral
characteristics that reveal their origin and
function. Machine learning techniques may be
used to detect and categorize novel viruses into
their recognized families utilizing the behavioral
patterns discovered via static or dynamic analysis.
In this paper, we'll talk about malware, its various
forms, malware concealment strategies, and
malware attack mechanisms. Additionally, many
detection methods and classification models are
presented in this study. The method of malware
analysis is demonstrated by conducting an
analysis of a malware program in a contained
environment.

Each year, there is an increase in the volume
and sophistication of cyberattacks, which affect
governments, businesses, and individuals equally
and result in significant reputational, financial, and
societal harm. As an illustration, hostile cyber
activities costed the U.S. economy alone up to 109
billion USD in 2016 [2]. Cybercriminals currently
carry out a variety of cyberattacks, including as
man-in-the-middle attacks, malware, and birthday
strikes. Malware assaults in particular have become
one of the most difficult problems in the
cybersecurity field and the major instrument used by
hackers. As a result, several tools and techniques
have been developed to identify and stop malware
assaults. By assessing whether a particular software
has malicious intent or not, antimalware
technologies stop malware. Specifically, the
majority of anti-malware techniques don't have low
enough mistake rates. Additionally, when they
encounter unknown viruses, their performance
significantly suffers. While 360,000 new malware
samples are discovered every day [3]. The
competition between malware creators and
defenders is intensifying as both malware in the wild
and anti-malware software advance. There is still a
long way to go in the pursuit of scalable and reliable
automated malware detection technologies.

Index: Malware, Malware Analysis Techniques,
Malware Detection Techniques, Classification
Models, Image analysis.

II. OVERVIEW OF MALWARE

I. INTRODUCTION
Malware is a short for malicious software, and
as its name implies, malwares is designed to hurt
computers and their users by stealing data, damaging
files, or just engaging in mischievous activities to
harm the user [1]. It has been stated that malware is
extensively disseminating and that computer
security incidents have dramatically increased.
Malware prevents networks from developing. The
internet-based apps that are the target of malware.
The necessity to identify and disable malware as
soon as possible has increased since practically
every aspect of life now depends on the Internet to
enhance its level of service and prevent the bad
effects that these malwares might cause.

This study provides an overview of the many
types of malware, malware analysis methodologies,
and malware detection strategies. This study also
offers a realistic examination of malware in sandbox
environment.

As the technologies advances, various malware
types are created by the malicious actors to bypass
the security features of a system. The malware also
uses some vulnerabilities to exploit the system
securities. So, it is very important to take into
consideration the following information about
malware [1].
A. Types of Malwares

Figure 1: Types of Malware
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Due to the wide variety of malware, it is crucial
that each malware item be clearly identified and
differentiated from other harmful software [2].
Therefore, the various malware categories are as
follows:
1) Ransomware
Ransomware is software that uses encryption
to disable access to the target's data until a ransom is
paid. Victim organizations are blocked to access the
data until payment is made, but there is no guarantee
that payment will generate the required decryption
key or that the provided decryption key will work
properly [4].
This year, the city of Baltimore was attacked
by a form of ransomware called RobbinHood, which
halted all city activities including tax collection,
property transfers and government emails for weeks.
The attacks have cost the city more than $18 million
to date, and the costs are still rising. The same type
of malware was used against the city of Atlanta in
2018, costing $17 million [3].
2) Adware
Adware tracks the users browsing activities to
determine which ads to serve. Adware is similar to
spyware, but does not install software on the user's
computer or record keystrokes. The danger of
adware is that it destroys the user's privacy. The data
obtained by the adware is matched with overtly or
covertly obtained data about the user's activities
elsewhere on the Internet to create a profile of that
person, including who they are friends with, what
they bought, where they travelled and more [1]. This
information may be shared or sold to advertisers
without users' consent.
An adware called Fireball infected 250 million
computers and devices in 2017, hijacking browsers
to change default search engines and track web
activity. However, this malware can be more than
just an annoyance. Three quarters of them were able
to execute code remotely and download malicious
files [3].
3) Spyware
Spyware collects information about user
activity without the user's knowledge or consent.
This may include passwords, PINs, payment
information and unstructured messages. The use of
spyware is not limited to desktop browsers. It may
even work with important apps and mobile phones.
Even if the data stolen is small, spyware can often
ripple through an organization, slowing performance
and hurting productivity [2].
Using the hotel's WIFI to target corporate and
government leaders, DarkHotel used several types
of malware to gain access to the systems of certain
powerful individuals. Once gained, the attackers

installed a keylogger to obtain the target's passwords
and other sensitive information [3].
4) Trojan horse
Trojans disguise themselves as target code or
software. If downloaded by an unsuspecting user,
the Trojan can take control of the victim's system for
malicious purposes. Trojans can be hidden in games,
programs, even software patches, or embedded in
phishing email attachments [4].
Emotet is a sophisticated banking Trojan that
has been around since 2014. Emotes are hard to
fight. This is because it evades signature-based
detection, is stable, and includes a player module to
aid in propagation. This Trojan is so common that it
has been warned by the US Department of
Homeland Security [3]. It shows that Emotet will
pay state, local, tribal and territorial governments up
to $1 million to remediate each incident.
5) Virus
A virus is code that inserts itself into a program
and is executed when the program is running. Once
inside a network, viruses can be used to steal
sensitive data, launch DDoS attacks, or conduct
ransomware attacks [2]. Viruses cannot run or
reproduce unless an infected program is running.
This dependence on a host program differentiates
viruses from Trojan horses that users must download
and worms that run without a program.
Nimda is a sophisticated virus containing a
mass mailing worm component that spreads as an
email attachment called README.EXE. This
affects users of Windows 95, Windows 98,
Windows Me, Windows NT 4, and Windows 2000
[3].
6) Worm
Worms target operating system vulnerabilities
to install themselves on networks. It can gain access
in a variety of ways, including backdoors built into
software, unwanted software vulnerabilities, or flash
drives [2]. Once deployed, worms can be used by
malicious attackers to launch DDoS attacks, steal
sensitive data, or conduct ransomware attacks [1].
Stuxnet was probably developed by American
and Israeli intelligence agencies to thwart Iran's
nuclear program. It has entered to Iran through a
flash drive. Because the environment was so airgapped, its creators did not expect Stuxnet to escape
the target network, but it did [3]. Once spread,
Stuxnet spread wildly, but did little damage because
its only function was to interfere with the industrial
controllers that ran the uranium enrichment process.
7) Root kit
A rootkit is software that allows malicious
attackers to remotely control a victim's computer
with full administrative privileges [1]. Rootkits can
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be injected into applications, kernels, hypervisors, or
operating systems. They are spread through
phishing, malicious attachments, malicious
downloads, and compromised shared drives.
Rootkits can also be used to hide other malware such
as keyloggers.
Zacinlo infects systems when users download
fake VPN apps. After installation, Zacinlo performs
a security check for competing malware and tries to
remove it. It then opens an invisible browser and
interacts with the content like a human by scrolling,
highlighting, and clicking. This activity is intended
to trick the behaviour analysis software. Zacinlo
loading occurs when the malware clicks on an ad in
an invisible browser [3]. This scam offers malicious
agents a portion of the commission by clicking on
the ad.
8) Bot/Botnet
A robot is a software program that performs
automated tasks based on commands. These are used
for legitimate purposes such as search engine
indexing, but when used for malicious purposes,
they take the form of self-propagating malware that
can connect to central servers. And are often used to
create a network of bots, which is used to launch a
flood of remote-controlled mass attacks such as
DDoS attacks. Botnets can grow very large. For
example, the Mirai IoT botnet ranged from 800,000
to 2.5 million computers [3].
Echobot is a variant of the famous Mirai.
Echobot attacks a wide range of IoT devices and
exploits more than 50 different vulnerabilities,
including exploits in Oracle WebLogic Server and
VMWare's
SD-Wan
networking
software.
Additionally, the malware looks for older,
unpatched systems. Echobot can be used by
malicious actors to launch DDoS attacks, disrupt
supply chains, steal sensitive supply chain
information, and sabotage businesses [3].
9) Keylogger
A keylogger is a type of spy software that
monitors user activity. Keyloggers have legal uses.
Businesses can use them to monitor employee
activity, and families can use them to track their
children's online behaviour, banking information,
and other confidential information. Keyloggers can
be injected into user’s system through phishing,
social engineering, or malicious downloads [1].
A keylogger called Olympic Vision has been
used in business email compromise (BEC) attacks
targeting merchants in the United States, the Middle
East, and Asia. Olympic Vision uses phishing and
social engineering techniques to infect targeted
systems, steal sensitive data, and spy on business
transactions. Keyloggers are not sophisticated, but
are available on the black market for $25, making
them very accessible to malicious actors [3].

10) Wiper
A Wiper is a type of malware with one goal
which is to erase user data so that it cannot be
recovered [2]. The wiper is used to destroy the
computer networks of public or private companies
in different sectors. Attackers also use wipers to
cover the tracks left behind after the break-in,
weakening the victim's ability to respond [2].
Malware called WhisperGate has been
reported to have been deployed against Ukrainian
targets. The incident was widely reported to involve
three separate components deployed by the same
enemy. This includes malicious bootloaders,
Discord-based downloaders, and file cleaners that
destroy local disks if detected. This activity occurred
at the same time that several websites belonging to
the Ukrainian government were defaced [3].
11) Mobile malware
Mobile malware threats are as diverse as those
targeting desktops, including Trojans, ransomware,
and ad click fraud [2]. They are distributed through
phishing and malicious downloads and are
particularly problematic on jailbroken phones,
which usually lack the default protections that were
part of the device's original operating system.
Triada is a rooted Trojan that has entered the
supply chain of millions of Android devices with
pre-installed malware. Triada accesses sensitive
areas of the operating system and installs spam
programs. Spam programs display ads and
sometimes replace legitimate ads. When a user
clicks on one of the unauthorized ads, the revenue
from that click goes to Triada developers [1].
12) Fileless malware
Fileless malware doesn't install anything
initially, instead making changes to native OS files,
such as PowerShell and WMI. Fileless attacks are
not caught by antivirus software because the
operating system recognizes the edited file as
legitimate. Because these attacks are stealthy, they
are up to ten times more successful than traditional
malware attacks [2].
Astaroth is a Fileless malware campaign that
targets users with links to LNK shortcut files. When
the user downloaded the file, the WMIC tool was
launched along with many other legitimate
Windows tools. These tools downloaded redundant
code that only ran in memory, leaving no evidence
that vulnerability scanners could detect. The
attackers then downloaded and executed a Trojan
horse that stole the credentials and uploaded them to
a remote server [3].
B. Malware Concealment Techniques
Malicious actors have used several malware
concealment techniques in order to avoid detection
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by anti-malware programs. These techniques are as
follows:
1) Encryption
By using this technique, malware is encrypted.
and comprises of malicious programs, keys, and
encryption and decryption methods. Every time, the
attacker creates a brand-new malware version using
a fresh encryption technique and key. Since the
decryption technique is constant, there is a larger
chance of being discovered [2]. This approach aims
to prevent static analysis and slowing down the
investigation.
2) Packing
Malware executable files are compressed and
encrypted using a packing process. Reverse
engineering techniques or the proper unpacking
algorithm are required to detect malware that uses a
packing strategy, which can be challenging at times
because it calls for knowledge of the actual
packing/compression process [1]. Two types of
packing are UPX and Upack.
3) Obfuscation
One of the various ways employed by malware
to avoid static analysis techniques and conventional
anti-malware solutions that rely on hashes and
strings for malware identification and analysis is
obfuscation [2]. By using this strategy, the core logic
of the code is obscured, preventing unauthorized
access to the code. Obfuscated malware's destructive
activity is hidden until it is triggered.
Inconsequential jumps and using trash instructions
are crucial obfuscation techniques [4].
4) Polymorphism
Malware that is polymorphic in nature, is made
to seem different every time it is run, yet it keeps all
of the original code. A polymorphic virus can use an
infinite number of encryption methods, as opposed
to encryption techniques, such that a piece of the
decryption code is altered in each implementation.
The transformation engine is often contained in
malware that is encrypted [4]. A random encryption
algorithm is generated whenever a mutation takes
place to re-encrypt the virus and engine with a new
decryption key. Different malicious behaviors may
be concealed by encryption techniques. Since the
original code is still present, polymorphic malware
is quite simple to find. The first polymorphic virus
was discovered is 1260 [1].

fall into two kinds. open-source malware, such as the
Conficker worm, that mutates by contacting other
websites online [1]. Open-world malware, such as
the Win32/Apparition infection, may reprogram
itself without interacting with the outside world by
altering binary code or using pseudocode
representation [2].
C. Malware Attack Vectors
Malware also uses various methods to spread
beyond the initial attack vector to other computer
systems. The definition of a malware attack vectors
may include the following:
• Email attachments containing malicious
code can be opened and executed by unsuspecting
users. If these emails are forwarded, the malware can
spread deeper into the organization and further
compromise the network.
• Malware can spread quickly when users
access and download infected files, such as file
servers based on Common Internet File Systems
(CIFS) and Network File Systems (NFS).
• File sharing software allows malware to
replicate itself on removable media and on computer
systems and networks.
• Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing allows
malware to enter by sharing seemingly harmless
files, such as music or images.
• Remotely exploitable vulnerabilities allow
hackers to gain access to systems regardless of
geographic location, with little or no intervention
from the computer user.
III. MALWARE DETECTION AND
CLASSIFICATION
Malware threats are becoming increasingly
complicated. Malware is still the most potent danger
to the online world, despite advancements in
detection & classification methods and models over
time [5]. Malware detection and classification are
crucial because they determine which family of
malware the malicious program belongs to, and on
that basis, malware prevention or anti-virus
solutions may be developed with a distinctive
signature to identify the malware.

Figure 2: Malware Detection and Classification
Process

5) Metamorphism

A. Malware Detection Techniques

The malicious code in metamorphism malware
is altered during each run to produce a unique
version that bears no resemblance to native code but
still functions as intended. Metamorphic malwares

Utilizing methods and technologies to detect,
prevent, notify, and handle the malware threats is
malware detection [6]. Basic malware detection
methods can assist in identifying and limiting
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known risks. Artificial intelligence and machine
learning are used by advanced malware detection
solutions to proactively search for and uncover new
and undiscovered malware threats [6].
1) Signature-based detection
Signature-based detection uses unique digital
footprints called signatures, of software programs
running on the protected system. Antivirus programs
scan the software, identify its signatures, and
compare them to signatures of known malware.
Antivirus products use large databases of known
malware signatures [5]. This database is usually
maintained by a security research team run by the
antivirus vendor. This database is updated
frequently and the latest version is synchronized
with the protected device.
When an antivirus program detects software
that matches a known signature, it stops the process
and quarantines or deletes it. It's a simple and
effective approach to malware detection and an
important first line of defense. However, as attackers
become more sophisticated, signature-based
approaches are unable to detect a wide variety of
new threats [7].
2) Checksumming
This method is a form of signature analysis that
involves calculating a cyclic redundancy check
(CRC) checksum. Checksumming help to make sure
that the files are not corrupted. The main drawback
of signature-based detection is that it creates a large
database and generates false positives. Checksums
are designed to handle this issue.
Hackers often use polymorphic malicious
advertisements to evade detection by signaturebased detection methods [5]. Polymorphic viruses
can modify themselves during replication and
remove fixed search strings. Hackers usually encode
a random set of decryption commands in the form of
a non-static key in the virus code. So, when security
teams detect a malicious signature, the malware no
longer contains code fragments, making it
undetectable [8]. Since variable code has no
detectable signature, other malicious code detection
techniques are required, such as:
• Statistical analysis - The frequency of
processor commands is examined using statistical
analysis to ascertain whether a file is contaminated.
• Cryptanalysis - An equation system is used
in cryptanalysis to decipher encrypted viruses. The
decryption program's algorithm and keys are rebuilt
by the cryptanalysis system, which then uses the
algorithm to decode segments of the virus's overall
body [5].
• Heuristics
Malware
detection
solutions use heuristics to monitor and analyze
behavioral data to spot suspicious activities. The
group needs to look for dangerous code linked to

suspicious conduct. The security team may then sort
suspicious instances by priority and carry out more
research [5].
• Reduced masks - When getting static code,
the malware detection solution might get around the
necessity for an encryption key by using
components inside the encrypted virus body. The
static code generated might show the malware's
mask or signature.
3) Application whitelists
Application whitelisting is the opposite of the
attack signature approach. Instead of deciding what
software to block, the antivirus keeps a list of
approved applications and blocks everything else
[7]. This is not a perfect solution, but it is very
effective, especially in high security environments.
Legitimate applications often contain security
vulnerabilities or introduce unnecessary features
that increase the attack surface. In some cases, the
program itself is harmless, but using it can threaten
end-user device [8]. For example, in some
environments it may be necessary to block web
browsing or email. Application whitelisting works
best on strictly task-focused devices, such as web
servers and Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
4) Machine learning behavior analysis
The Machine learning behaviour analysis is
also known as a "static" detection technique because
it relies on binary rules to match or not match the
processes running in the environment [6]. Static
malware detection cannot be learned. the solution is
flexible to add more rules or change them over time
to expand the coverage. In contrast, new dynamic
techniques based on artificial intelligence and
machine learning (AI/ML) enable security tools to
distinguish between legitimate and malicious files
and processes, even when they do not match known
patterns or signatures [7]. It does this by observing
file behavior, network traffic, process frequency,
deployment patterns, and more.
Over time, these algorithms learn what "bad"
files look like, allowing them to detect new and
unknown malware. AI/ML malware detection is
known as “behavioral” detection because it is based
on analysing the behaviour of suspicious processes
[7]. These algorithms have malicious behavior
thresholds, and if a file or process exhibits abnormal
behavior above the threshold, it is determined to be
malicious. Behavioral analysis is powerful, but it
can miss malicious processes or misclassify
legitimate processes as malicious. Additionally,
attackers can manipulate the AI/ML training process
[8].
5) Endpoint Protection Platform (EPP)
EPP is deployed on endpoints such as
employee workstations, servers, and cloud-based
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resources [8]. They act as the first line of defense
that can detect and block threats before they can
harm users’ sensitive assets. EPP uses several
techniques to detect and block malware, which are
as follows:
• Static Analysis - EPP uses traditional static
analysis techniques to identify known malware types
and
allow/deny
applications
flagged
by
administrators.
• Behavioral Analysis - EPP adds behavioral
analysis to identify unknown threats or known
malware that use evasion tactics such as hopping and
encryption [5].
• Sandboxed inspection - EPP can run
suspicious content in a safe box isolated from the
main operating system. This allows the technician to
explode a file and observe its behavior to see if it is
truly malicious.
• Content Disarmament and Reconstruction
(CDR) - EPP removes malicious elements from
legitimate content and allows users to access the
content itself [8]. For example, if a Word document
contains malicious macros, CDR can remove the
macros and allow the user to access the file instead
of blocking the file completely.
In addition to these techniques, EPP can
proactively protect user environment, such as
isolating endpoints from the network when malware
is detected.
6) Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)
EDR solutions complement EPP solutions and
enable security teams to detect and respond to
attacks on endpoint devices. If EPP fails to contain
threats, EDR can:
• Alert Triage and Investigation - EDR
provides information rich data from endpoints that
allows security analysts to identify symptoms of an
attack and investigate them to confirm security
incidents [6].
• Threat Hunting - EDR allows analyst to
proactively search for endpoints and examine
associated data for signs of compromise. Once
analysts spot threats on endpoints, EDR platforms
can be used for incident response. For example,
analysts can quarantine all malware-affected
devices, wipe and reimage infected endpoints, and
run automated security plays [8]. Analyst can use
security playbooks to coordinate their response to
malware threats across multiple security tools, such
as firewalls, network segmentation, intrusion
prevention systems (IPS), and email security. Many
EDR solutions have built-in EPP functionality [5].
B. Malware Classification Models
Malware classification have traditionally
depended on pattern matching using signatures
taken from particular malware samples. While

straightforward and effective, signature scanning is
easily thwarted by a variety of widely used evasive
techniques [10]. Because of this, statistical and
machine learning-based solutions have emerged that
are more resistant to code alteration. As a result,
malware authors have created sophisticated varieties
of malware that change the structural and statistical
characteristics of their code, which can lead to the
failure of statistical models [9]. To counteracts these
types of malware various machine learning models
are used for classification. These models are as
follows:
1) Multilayer Perceptron
A perceptron may be used to create a classifier
based on a threshold since it computes a weighted
sum of its components in the form of a hyperplane.
In situations when the data itself is not linearly
separable, it follows that a perceptron cannot give
optimal separation [10]. This is a serious restriction
since even something as simple as the XOR function
cannot be linearly separated. An artificial neural
network that uses many layers in the shape of
perceptrons is known as a multilayer perceptron
(MLP). MLPs may properly mimic more
complicated functions since they are not constrained
to linear decision boundaries like single layer
perceptrons.
The link between linear support vector
machines (SVM) and SVMs based on nonlinear
kernel functions is quite similar to that between
perceptrons and MLPs. Given that there are hidden
layers separating the input from the output and it is
unclear how changing the weights in these hidden
levels would influence the output or the other hidden
layers, training an MLP would seem to be difficult
[11]. Today, backpropagation is typically used to
train MLPs. An important innovation that made deep
learning feasible was the realisation that
backpropagation may be utilised for training neural
networks [9].
2) Convolutional Neural Network
Fully linked layers are what artificial neural
networks often employ. A fully connected layer has
the benefit of being able to deal with correlations
between any points in training vectors in an efficient
manner [10]. However, because to the enormous
number of weights that must be learnt, completely
linked layers are impractical for large training
vectors. A convolutional neural network (CNN), on
the other hand, is built to handle local structure.
When important information is not local, a
convolutional layer cannot be expected to perform
effectively [11].
The advantage of CNNs is that because there
are less weights, convolutional layers can be learned
considerably more quickly than fully connected
layers [12]. The majority of the crucial structure in
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images—such as edges and gradients—is local. As a
result, CNNs are a perfect tool for picture analysis,
and they were actually created specifically for image
categorization. In contrast, CNNs have excelled in a
number of other problem fields [9]. Any issue where
local structure predominates is typically a candidate
for CNNs.
3) Recurrent Neural Network
MLPs and CNNs are examples of feedforward
neural networks, meaning that there is no "memory"
of past feature vectors and that data is sent straight
through the network. Each input vector in a
feedforward network is handled separately from all
other input vectors. While feedforward networks are
suitable for a variety of issues, dealing with
sequential data is not one of them [10]. A
feedforward neural network can gain context or
memory by using a recurrent neural network (RNN).
Backpropagation via time, a kind of
backpropagation, is used to train RNNs (BPTT). The
tendency of the gradient computation to become
unstable, leading to "vanishing" or "exploding"
gradients, is an issue that is particularly significant
in BPTT. The number of time steps is restricted in
order to solve these issues, but doing so also helps to
restrict the usefulness of RNNs [12]. As an
alternative, specific RNN designs that allow the
gradient to flow across extended timespans are
utilised.
4) Long Short-Term Memory
A type of RNN topologies called long shortterm memory (LSTM) networks is made to handle
long-range dependencies. In other words, LSTM can
handle long "gaps" between the time a feature first
appears and the time the model really needs it. Due
to vanishing gradients, this is often not viable with
simple RNNs [11]. An LSTM has an extra conduit
for information flow, which is a fundamental
distinction between it and a standard, vanilla RNN.
This means that in addition to the concealed state,
there is a second state known as the cell state that
may be utilised to effectively store data from earlier
phases. During backpropagation, the cell state is
intended to act as a gradient "highway." In this
method, there is less likelihood that the gradient will
disappear (or expand) along the way and can "flow"
considerably further back [10].

LSTM's [9]. As a result, training a GRU is simpler
than training an LSTM, necessitating less training
data.
6) ResNet152
A residual network (ResNet) includes extra
connections that correspond to identity layers,
whereas LSTM employs a complicated gating
structure to facilitate gradient flow. By efficiently
skipping over layers during training thanks to these
identity layers, a ResNet model can lower the depth
of training and lessen gradient pathologies [10].
ResNet is intuitively able to create larger networks
by initially training across a much shallower
network, with later training steps serving to detail
the intermediary connections.
Pyramidal cells in the brain, which have a
similar trait in that they connect "layers" of neurons,
served as an inspiration for this method. A special
deep ResNet architecture called ResNet152 has been
pre-trained using a sizable picture dataset [12]. The
output layer of the ResNet152 model is retrained
particularly for the malware classification challenge.
7) VGG-19
A dataset with more than 106 pictures was used
to pre-train the 19-layer convolutional neural
network known as VGG-19. This architecture has
excelled in several competitions and has been used
to a wide range of image-based issues [9]. One of the
two instances of transfer learning for image-based
malware classification uses the VGG-19
architecture and a pretrained model [12].
IV. MALWARE ANALYSIS
The process of identifying and minimizing
possible dangers in a website, application, or server
is known as malware analysis [15]. Understanding a
suspicious file or URL's behavior and intended
purpose is a critical step in ensuring computer
security as well as the safety and security of an
organization with relation to sensitive data.
Vulnerabilities are addressed through malware
analysis before they become major issues [16].

5) Gated Recurrent Unit
The LSTM design has seen various variations
due to its widespread popularity. The majority of
these variations are modest, differing just slightly
from a typical LSTM [16]. A gated recurrent unit
(GRU), however, differs significantly from an
LSTM. There are fewer parameters in a GRU,
despite the fact that its internal state is more
complicated and less understandable than an

Figure 3: Malware Analysis Tree

Page 7 of 12

Benefits of Malware Analysis
Security analysts and incident responders can
greatly benefit from malware research [13]. Here are
some of the procedure's main advantages:
• Determining the attack's origin.
• Calculating the harm caused by a security
threat.
• Determining the exploitation potential,
vulnerability, and necessary patching measures for
malware.
• Practically speaking, occurrences are
prioritized according to the seriousness of the threat.
• Identifying and blocking any concealed
Indicators of Compromise (IOC).
• Enhancing
the
effectiveness
of
notifications, alerts, and IOC.
• Adding context to the search for risks.
Types of Malware Analysis
There are three types of malware analysis that
can be conducted:
• Static malware analysis.
• Dynamic malware analysis.
• Hybrid malware analysis.
1) Static analysis
Static malware analysis works in a manner akin
to that of statistical and signature-based analysis. In
reality, it frequently combines elements of the two
methods [13]. Most malware exhibits common
behavioral and statistical indicators. A security
professional or anti-virus software may evaluate the
application and determine whether it's probable
malware based on these. Additionally, it is not
necessary to start the malware software in order to
identify it. A malware is identified by looking at its
control flow graphs and opcode sequences [14].
The process of extracting strings from the
executable file is frequently used to identify
questionable programming. Searching and replacing
files, establishing connections to external servers,
encrypting executables, loading certain libraries and
functions, etc. To understand how a piece of code
works, it may also be reduced down into assembly
language [14].
2) Dynamic analysis
The suspicious software is run in a secure,
sandbox environment virtual during dynamic
analysis so that it cannot impact the real systems.
This enables the user to see the suspected malware
in action and determine if it is malware by looking
at how it behaves [13]. Controlling the execution
flow and seeing how the sample interacts with the
system, such as efforts to create persistence or
access sensitive data, also enables malware analysts
to gain a deeper knowledge of the virus. In terms of
delivering results, dynamic analysis already

outperforms static analysis in a number of areas.
Run-time actions are far more difficult to obscure or
hide than static binary code [15]. Without the analyst
needing to examine its internals, the malware is just
carrying out its intended function.
3) Hybrid analysis
In order to overcome the weaknesses of each
methodology, hybrid analysis uses approaches from
both. When unpacking the binary files or reading
them in assembly code, some operations that might
be masked at run-time might be seen [16]. Similar to
this, obfuscated opcode may be exposed after
execution when the outcomes or actions are seen in
real time.
Malware analysis
In this section, we are going to demonstrate
malware analysis using the tool volatility in the
windows environment.
We'll be utilising volatility, one of the most
well-liked volatile memory software analysers, in
this part. With the aid of this programme, we can
examine a volatile memory dump from a machine
that could be infected. This software will assist us in
retrieving important data such as active processes,
recently updated files, or even user browsing history
that has been saved in the computer's memory.
In this part, we'll perform a number of volatility
commands using the following straightforward case:
the Cridex malware
Analyses of dump
To learn more about the memory dump, we
need to execute the imageinfo command as the
first step in the volatility plugin by giving the
imageinfo and -f options for our dump file.

Now that we know the operating system from
which
this
memory
dump
originates
(WinXPSP2x86). We can now start the investigation
by giving volatility the OS profile (—
profile=WinXPSP2x86) and attempting to determine
what took place on the victim's machine.
Let's use the pslist plugin to determine what
processes were active.

Page 8 of 12

To display the processes and their parent
processes instead of the pslist plugin, the
command pstree is used

At first inspection, we can see a strange process
with the name ‘reader sl.exe’ and the parent process
(PPID) ‘explorer.exe’, which was one of the last
processes to run on the computer.
Before digging deeper into these two
processes, let's perform one final command. When
operating on the computer, processes that attempt to
disguise themselves will be listed by psxview; this
plugin may be quite helpful.

Except for our instance, no processes appear to
be hidden; if they are, “False” will be displayed in
the first two columns (pslist and psscan).
Let's return to this examination; after seeing the
processes, it would be wise to look at the computer's
active sockets and open connections. These several
plugins will be used in this process: sockets,
connscan, and netscan
Connscan is a plugin that scans for TCP
connections,

Sockets prints a list of open sockets,

And netscan scans an image for connections
and sockets but cannot be used in our scenario owing
to the profile used.

In our example, the process with PID 1484
utilises two TCP connections by looking at our
command history outputs we can easily link the PID
1484 to the process explorer.exe. One of these TCP
connections, utilising port 1038 and connecting to
the target IP address 41.168.5.140, is still active, as
can be seen.
Now let's examine the most recent commands
executed using cmdscan, consoles, and cmdline
plugins.

The first two plugins, consoles and cmdscan,
did not have any data in their buffers. Consoles
extracts command history by looking for
_CONSOLE INFORMATION, while cmdscan
extracts command history by looking for
_COMMAND HISTORY.

However, the cmdline plugin that shows
command-line parameters for processes did provide
us with useful data. The processes started with PID
1484 and 1640 have, in fact, completed their whole
route at this point. More and more questions are
being raised about the ‘Reader sl.exe’ process.
As of right now, we know that this process was
started by the Explorer process and that it is a
traditional Adobe Reader programme. However, we
saw that this exact same process was maintaining a
connection to an external IP. But we should not leap
to conclusions too early. Instead, examine the
relevant executable and its analysis using
procdump and memdump, respectively, by
supplying the -p 1640, which is its PID, and —
dump-dir, which is the directory where these dumps
are extracted.
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Reader sl.exe is restored in the first file,
‘executable.1640.exe,’ and the process's accessible
memory is depicted in the dump file, ‘1640.dmp’,
which was extracted. Windows instantly
quarantined the file when the.exe file was produced,
declaring it to be a Trojan.

view a fully working web application with a card
payment gateway.
Now let's check to determine if the executable
is malicious.
At this point, we have two options on how to
proceed. First, either to perform a static analysis and
reverse the executable to determine specifically
what commands it uses and its purpose, or try a
dynamic analysis by utilising a sandbox or online
tools that evaluate possibly harmful executables as
I'm not comfortable with reverse analysis at the
moment.
But let's choose the second option and scan the
files with VirusTotal and HybridAnalysis, arguably
the most well-known website for suspicious file and
website analysis.

In order to perform a quick examination of
these files, we need to open the file in notepad.exe;
we have to search for the information because most
dumps include a tonne of information. In our
instance, we're seeking for a relationship between
the data previously taken from the dump—
specifically, the tcp connection established with the
IP address 41.168.5.140 and with this 1640 process.
Snapshot from VirusTotal showing the result of the
PID 1640

We now have additional context for the
material obtained thanks to the usage of the grep tool
along with the -C *NUMBER option. Here, it is easy
to observe that the executable ‘Reader sl.exe’ is
sending POST requests to the target IP
41.168.5.140, perhaps stealing data from the
victim's computer system.
These intriguing domains can be discovered,
by using the strings command to examine the
extraction dump

The above output shows us a list of sites with
the Bank domain. Looking at the process memory
has given us further grounds to be wary about
‘Reader sl.exe’. One may scroll down further to

Snapshot from HybridAnalysis showing the result of
the PID 1640.
Clearly, these two sandboxing websites with
strong detection scores have identified the .exe as
dangerous. It's time to summarise the many inquiries
we've performed and our conclusions using the
studied dump:
• Reader sl.exe, PID 1640 which is a
suspicious process of Explorer with
a ParentPID 1484.
• An open connection of PID 1484 is to the
IP address 41.168.5.140:8080
• 41.168.5.140 and bank domains were
discovered in the process 1640 dump.
• By sandboxing websites, 1640 executables
were identified as dangerous Trojans.
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If a user's computer produced these IOCs then we
may infer that the machine is trojan-infected. We
should stop sending any communication to the
specified IPs, note the IPs from which the traffic
originated, and isolate those systems. The trojan
should then be quarantined and removed from the
compromised machine.
V. CONCLUSION
It can be concluded that the importance of
malware analysis and detection is very important in
today’s situation. Without them the malware can
pose serious threats to the data and information
systems of many organizations. The malware that
has the power to spread is the most harmful since
there is no centralized control, making it difficult to
guard against them. According to studies, one of the
biggest threats to computer security is malware.
Malware authors frequently come up with
innovative concepts. They create malware in such a
manner that it alters itself periodically in order to
avoid being detected.
Malware authors always strive to create
programs that are difficult to detect, and with time,
they have effectively improved the tactics they
employ to conceal or morph the dangerous code.
These concepts begin with straightforward
encryption before moving on to oligomorphic,
polymorphic, and metamorphic viruses. Antivirus
scanners are one method of detecting some of the
malware programs, however with advancements in
malware creation techniques, malware detectors
utilize a variety of strategies to mitigate the negative
impacts of this software. Due to the shortcomings of
the currently available malware detection methods,
machine learning and data mining techniques are
coupled with existing detection methods to increase
the efficiency of the detection process. In spite of
their effectiveness in detecting known malware,
signature-based detection techniques are unable to
identify polymorphic and unknown malware since
these threats can alter their signatures. Because new
malware signatures have not yet been generated,
signature-based detection cannot detect them.
Heuristic-based detection techniques may find new,
well-known, and undiscovered viruses, but they
have a high percentage of false positives and false
negatives, which motivates us to create more precise
detection techniques. Heuristic-based detection
approaches are paired with machine learning
methods to boost malware detection efficiency and
accuracy as a result of the exponential growth of
polymorphic malware.
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